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Abstract
Indirect reciprocity, in which individuals help others with a good reputation but not those with a bad reputation, is a
mechanism for cooperation in social dilemma situations when individuals do not repeatedly interact with the same
partners. In a relatively large society where indirect reciprocity is relevant, individuals may not know each other’s reputation
even indirectly. Previous studies investigated the situations where individuals playing the game have to determine the
action possibly without knowing others’ reputations. Nevertheless, the possibility that observers of the game, who generate
the reputation of the interacting players, assign reputations without complete information about them has been neglected.
Because an individual acts as an interacting player and as an observer on different occasions if indirect reciprocity is
endogenously sustained in a society, the incompleteness of information may affect either role. We examine the game of
indirect reciprocity when the reputations of players are not necessarily known to observers and to interacting players. We
find that the trustful discriminator, which cooperates with good and unknown players and defects against bad players,
realizes cooperative societies under seven social norms. Among the seven social norms, three of the four suspicious norms
under which cooperation (defection) to unknown players leads to a good (bad) reputation enable cooperation down to a
relatively small observation probability. In contrast, the three trustful norms under which both cooperation and defection to
unknown players lead to a good reputation are relatively efficient.
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Introduction
We often help others even when the helping behavior is costly.
The Prisoner’s Dilemma game and its variants are used for
examining cooperative behavior in such social dilemma situations.
Several mechanisms can explain the emergence and maintenance
of cooperation [1,2]. Direct reciprocity, one such mechanism, is
relevant when the same pair of players repeatedly interact [3,4].
To avoid retaliation from a peer player, it is beneficial for both
players to maintain cooperation. However, direct reciprocity
cannot explain cooperation in relatively large societies, where
players do not repeatedly meet each other.
Indirect reciprocity is a main mechanism for cooperation in
cases where players never interact with the same partners [5–8]. In
indirect reciprocity, players are motivated to help others and
receive help from different others. There are two types of indirect
reciprocity mechanisms: upstream and downstream reciprocity
[2,9,10]. The two types of indirect reciprocity differ in the
direction of the chain of helping behavior. In upstream reciprocity,
a player is motivated to help after the player has been helped by
someone. In downstream reciprocity, a player will be helped after
the player has helped someone. In downstream reciprocity, players
possess unique reputation scores, determined by their past actions
toward other players. Players help others with a good reputation
but not those with a bad reputation. Nowak and Sigmund
proposed a computational model in which players helping others
are regarded to be good and those withdrawing help are regarded
to be bad [6,7]. According to their model, helping others to
maintain a good reputation is more beneficial than withdrawing
help to gain momentary profits. Empirical studies also support
downstream reciprocity [11–14]. In the present study, we focus on
downstream reciprocity and simply refer to it as indirect
reciprocity.
T h er u l ea c c o r d i n gt ow h i c hp l a y e r sd e c i d ee i t h e rt oc o o p e r a t eo r
to defect based on the reputations of the relevant players is called the
action rule [15,16]. The discriminator that helps those with a good
reputation and does not help those with a bad reputation is an
example of the action rule. The rule for assigning a reputation to
players based on their actions is called the social norm [15,16].
Nowak and Sigmund’s norm is termed image scoring [6,7].
Theoretically, the discriminator is an unstable action rule under
image scoring because the discriminator is invaded by the
unconditional cooperator [17–19]. The discriminator is stable under
some more complex social norms including standing [15,17,18,20–
23], judging [15,21–24], and shunning [10,23,25]. These complex
social norms require more information about other players than
image scoring does, such as the co-player’s reputation, in addition to
the information on the player’s action toward the co-player.
Unless an authority maintains the reputation of all the players,
as in the case of online marketplaces [26,27] and communities of
medieval merchants [28], the information about players, which is
indispensable for indirect reciprocity, must spread from players to
players via gossiping [10,14,15,29]. However, except in a
sufficiently small population, the accuracy and span of gossip
may be limited [16,30,31]. In such a case, the information about
players is shared incompletely in the population, and individuals
often need to make decisions when the information about the
relevant players is unknown.
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necessarily know the reputation of others [6,7,18,19,21,30,31].
However, these studies have two limitations. First, it is assumed in
these studies that only players playing the game, not the third-
party observers of the game, incompletely perceive the reputation
of other players. The role of the third-party observer is to generate
the reputation about players and disseminate it to other players in
the population. The observer can propagate the reputation about
players to others only when the observer knows the reputation
about the players in question. Figure 1 illustrates the point. In a
one-shot game, a player knows or does not know the co-player’s
reputation (A). In addition, an observer, who watches the game
but does not play the game, knows or does not know the co-
player’s reputation (B). Previous studies considered incomplete
observation of type A but not B. In reality, however, the
interacting player and the observer are roles that the same
individual may play on different occasions such that both roles
may accompany incomplete access to information about others.
Second, these studies examined the sustainability of a few
exemplary combinations of the social norm and action rule (e.g.,
combinations of the image scoring norm and the discriminator
action rule [6]). The choice of the pairs of social norm and action
rule is subjective. On the other hand, exhaustive studies in which
all the pairs of social norm and action rule within a certain class
are examined are not concerned with the issue of incomplete
information [15]. These studies considered erroneous behavior,
such as wrong assignment of the reputation to other players.
However, the error probability is eventually set to be infinitesi-
mally small. We assume that the information about the reputation
is available to interacting players and observers with an arbitrary
probability between 0 and 1.
In the present study, we perform an exhaustive search to
explore the possibility of indirect reciprocity under the social
norms that permit observers to assign reputations to unknown
players. The manner in which individuals may know the
reputation about others generally depends on details of informa-
tion spreading processes (e.g., gossiping on a social network). We
do not consider explicit mechanisms of information spreading and
model the incomplete observation by the probability with which a
player and an observer know the reputation of the co-player in a
one-shot game. In particular, we investigate two types of
observation: concomitant and independent observation (see
Results). Our exhaustive analysis reveals that the trustful
discriminator that helps players with a good or unknown
reputation and does not help players with a bad reputation is
the only self-supporting action rule under several social norms.
Even if the fraction of players knowing others’ reputation is
relatively small, the population can be sufficiently cooperative.
Methods
Model
We generalize the model of indirect reciprocity derived from the
donation game with binary reputation values [7,15,16,18,19,21–
23,25,30–32] with an additional assumption that players know the
reputation of a fraction of other players. Consider an infinitely
large population. From this population, we arbitrarily select two
players, one as a donor and the other as a recipient. The donor
either cooperates (C) with or defects (D) against the recipient. If
the donor cooperates, the donor pays cost c, and the recipient
gains benefit b. We assume 0vcvb such that the defection is
rational for the donor in a one-shot game, whereas cooperation
contributes to the welfare of the population. We repeat the same
procedure until each player is paired with a sufficient number of
others but never with the same opponent. In this way, we exclude
direct reciprocity. Consequently, the participation of each player
in the games as a donor and a recipient is equally probable.
Each player possesses a binary reputation value, i.e., good (G)o r
bad (B). We assume that a third player serves as an observer of a
one-shot game and assigns G or B to the donor. In a one-shot
game, the donor and the observer know the reputation of the
recipient with probability q (0vqƒ1). The probability that the
reputation of the recipient, which is actually G or B, is unknown
(U) to the donor and the observer is 1{q. The recognition of the
reputation by the donor and that by the observer are assumed to
occur concomitantly or independently (see Results). In contrast to
previous studies, observers as well as donors in our model are
imperfect with regard to knowing the recipients’ reputation.
The donor’s action (C or D) depends on the recipient’s
reputation (G, B,o rU in the donor’s eyes). For example, a player
that cooperates with a G recipient, represented as C?G, and also
cooperates with B and U recipients (i.e., C?B and C?U)i s
referred to as the unconditional cooperator (ALLC). A player
obeying the action rule D?G, D?B, and D?U is called the
unconditional defector (ALLD). A player obeying the action rule
C?G, D?B, and C?U is a discriminator that also cooperates
with recipients whose reputation is unknown to the donor; this
discriminator is denoted by DISC. Because an action rule is
Figure 1. Two types of incomplete observation in a one-shot
game. We distinguish two types of observation. First, an interacting
player (actually, donor) knows or does not know the co-player’s
(actually, recipient’s) reputation (A). Second, an observer of the game
knows or does not know the co-player’s reputation (B). Previous studies
have treated only the incompleteness of type A.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002113.g001
Author Summary
Humans and other animals often help others even when
the helping behavior is costly. Several mechanisms can
explain the emergence and maintenance of cooperation.
In one such mechanism called indirect reciprocity,
individuals are rated according to their past behavior
toward others. Individuals help others with a good
reputation but not those with a bad reputation. Indirect
reciprocity is relevant in relatively large societies where
individuals do not meet each other repeatedly. Then,
unless an authority maintains the reputation of individuals,
individuals would not know information about some
others even indirectly via gossip. We investigated a model
in which both individuals playing the game (acting players)
and observers of the game, who evaluate acting players
and start gossiping, incompletely perceive others. In the
unique viable and cooperative strategy, one cooperates
with good and unknown peers and defects against bad
peers. Populations of suspicious observers under which
cooperation (defection) to unknown peers is regarded to
be good (bad) enable cooperation in relatively wide
parameter regions. In contrast, populations of trustful
observers under which both cooperation and defection to
unknown peers are regarded to be good are relatively
efficient.
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there are 23~8 action rules.
The observer updates the reputation of the donor based on the
donor’s action (C or D) and the recipient’s reputation (G, B,o r
U in the observer’s eyes). We refer to the update rule as the
social norm. The class of social norms that we are considering is
called the second-order assessment [10]; the update rule depends
on two kinds of information: the donor’s action and the
recipient’s reputation. When q~1 (therefore, no U recipients),
simple standing, stern judging, and shunning, which are
schematically shown in Fig. 2, belong to this class. To simplify
notation, we henceforth refer to simple standing, stern judging,
and shunning as standing, judging, and shunning, respectively.
For example, in the case of standing, the observer assigns
reputation G when the donor cooperates with a good recipient
(C?G) or when the recipient is bad (C?B, D?B) and assigns B
when D?G. Because a second-order social norm is specified by
the allocations of G or B to each of C?G, C?B, C?U, D?G,
D?B,a n dD?U when 0vqƒ1, there are 22|3~64 social
norms.
We also assume that the donor receives a new reputation
opposite to that intended by the observer with a small probability
 %1. With probability 1{ , the observer assigns a reputation to
the donor according to the social norm. This error models the
limited ability of the observer. Another reason for introducing the
error is that G and B players must coexist in the population for
distinguishing the efficiency of different social norms and action
rules.
Analysis Methods
We analyze the stability and cooperativeness of the homoge-
neous population of each of the 8 action rules under each of the 64
social norms by adopting the exhaustive search method introduced
in Refs. [15,16]. Given a value of q, we check whether each
combination of the social norm and action rule (there are
64|8~512 combinations in total) satisfies the following two
properties.
Stability: For a given social norm, an action rule is a strict
Nash equilibrium (NE), if the payoff of the action rule against itself
is greater than the payoff of any other action rule against the focal
action rule.
Cooperativeness: For a given social norm, an action rule is
cooperative, if players in the homogeneous population in which
everyone adopts the focused action rule cooperate with a
sufficiently large probability.
The precise procedure is as follows.
Stability. For a social norm and a value of q, consider an
almost homogeneous population in which almost all the players
adopt action rule s and an infinitesimal fraction of mutant players
adopt action rule s
0
. We examine the stability of s against s
0
.W e
denote by p(s,s) and p(s
0
,s) the payoffs that players obeying s
and s
0
, respectively, obtain in the almost homogeneous population
of players obeying s. Note that the payoff is defined as the
expectation of the accumulated payoff obtained by playing many
one-shot games. We assume that the number of the games that
each player plays is fixed and sufficiently large and that a player is
not paired with the same partner more than once. We examine the
strong Nash stability using p(s,s) and p(s
0
,s); we are not
concerned with population dynamics. An action rule s is a strict
NE if p(s,s)wp(s
0
,s) for all the other 23{1~7 action rules s
0
(=s). If s is a strict NE, s is also an evolutionarily stable strategy
(ESS).
Let p be the probability that the reputation of a player in the
homogeneous population of players obeying s is equal to G. After
a sufficient number of games, p relaxes to the unique stable
equilibrium p  [15] determined by
p ~p  WG(s)z(1{p ) WB(s), ð1Þ
where WG(s) and WB(s) are the probabilities that the reputation of
a donor obeying s becomes G, given that the recipient has
reputation G and B, respectively. After a single-shot game, a
donor’s reputation may become G via either of the following two
events. First, the donor may meet a G recipient with probability p,
and the donor’s action toward the recipient, in accordance with
action rule s, is regarded to be G with probability WG(s). Second,
the donor may meet a B recipient with probability 1{p, and the
donor’s action toward the recipient is regarded to be G with
probability WB(s). The two terms on the right-hand side of Eq. (1)
represent the probabilities of the two events in the equilibrium.
WG(s) and WB(s) depend on the specificity of how donors and
observers know the recipients’ reputation and are described in
Results. For example, a social norm that regards any action of
donors (i.e., C or D)t ob eG gives WG(s)~WB(s)~1{ .
If a small number of mutants obeying s
0
exist in the almost
homogeneous population of players obeying s, the probability that
a mutant has reputation G, denoted by p
0 , is determined by
p
0 ~p  WG(s
0
)z(1{p ) WB(s
0
): ð2Þ
In the equilibrium, almost all the players obey s, and they have G
reputation with probability p . Then, a mutant donor obeying s
0
may meet a G recipient with probability p , and the donor’s action
toward the recipient is regarded to be G with probability WG(s
0
).
Alternatively, the mutant donor may meet a B recipient with
probability 1{p , and the donor’s action toward the recipient is
regarded to be G with probability WB(s
0
). The two terms on the
right-hand side of Eq. (2) represent the probabilities of the two
events. The right-hand side of Eq. (2) can be calculated by using p 
obtained by solving Eq. (1).
A donor obeying action rule s cooperates in one of the following
three ways. First, the donor may sense the recipient’s reputation
with probability q, the recipient’s reputation is G with probability
p, and the donor cooperates if the donor is supposed to cooperate
with G recipients under action rule s. Second, the donor may
sense the recipient’s reputation with probability q, the recipient’s
reputation is B with probability 1{p, and the donor cooperates if
the donor is supposed to cooperate with B recipients under action
rule s. Third, the donor does not sense the recipient’s reputation
with probability 1{q and cooperates if the donor is supposed to
cooperate with U recipients. Therefore, the probability that a
Figure 2. Second-order social norms when q~1. Second-order
social norms that realize indirect reciprocity when q~1. They are
termed simple standing, stern judging, and shunning. In this paper, we
simply refer to them as standing, judging, and shunning, respectively.
Under these social norms, the discriminator is stable and cooperative.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002113.g002
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Y(s,p)~qp fG(s)z(1{p) fB(s) ½  z(1{q) fU(s): ð3Þ
fG(s), fB(s),o rfU(s) is equal to 1 when the donor obeying s
cooperates with the recipient having reputation G, B,o rU,
respectively. Otherwise, fG(s), fB(s),o rfU(s) is equal to 0. For
example, fG(s)~1, fB(s)~0, and fU(s)~1 if s~DISC.
The expected payoffs in a single donation game in the
equilibrium are given by
p(s,s)~{c Y(s,p )zb Y(s,p ) ð4Þ
and
p(s
0
,s)~{c Y(s
0
,p )zb Y(s,p
0 ): ð5Þ
The first terms on the right-hand side of Eqs. (4) and (5) represent
the cost when the player is a donor and the second terms represent
the benefit when the player is a recipient. We have neglected the
proportionality constant 1=2.
Cooperativeness. A strict NE action rule may not be
sufficiently cooperative. ALLD is such an example. To exclude
non-cooperative equilibria, we use the criterion of cooperativeness
introduced in Refs. [15,16]. We expand Y(s,p ) in a power series
in terms of the probability of assignment error   as
Y(s,p )~Y0(s,p )z  Y1(s,p )zO( 2): ð6Þ
Action rule s is defined to be cooperative if Y0(s,p )~1. In this
case, the player always cooperates as donor in the limit of no
assignment error. For example, consider a homogeneous
population of players adopting s~DISC under a social norm
that regards any action of the donor (i.e., C or D)t ob eG, except
for the assignment error. Then, we obtain the obvious steady state
of the reputation p ~1{ . By substituting fG(s)~1, fB(s)~0,
and fU(s)~1, which describes DISC, and p ~1{  in Eq. (3), we
obtain Y(s,p )~qp z1{q~1{ q. Therefore, Y0(s,p )~1
and DISC satisfies the condition of cooperativeness under this
social norm. On the other hand, in a homogeneous population of
players adopting s~ALLD, fG(s)~fB(s)~fG(s)~0 so that
Y(s,p )~q:0z(1{q):0~0. Therefore, Y0(s,p )~0. ALLD
does not satisfy the condition of cooperativeness under any
social norm.
Summary of the Methods. In summary, we check the
stability and cooperativeness of action rule s under a given social
norm, the values of b, c, and q, as follows:
1. Calculate p  from Eq. (1).
2. Calculate p
0  by substituting p  in Eq. (2).
3. Calculate p(s,s) by substituting p  in Eqs. (3) and (4).
4. For each of the other seven action rules s
0
=s,
(a) Calculate p(s
0
,s) by substituting p  and p
0  in Eqs. (3) and
(5).
(b) If p(s,s)ƒp(s
0
,s), s is unstable against s
0
.
5. If s is stable against all the seven action rules s
0
,
(a) Calculate Y0(s,p ) using Eqs. (3) and (6).
(b) s is cooperative if Y0(s,p )~1.
Results
We deal with two types of observation. Subsection ‘‘Concom-
itant Observation’’ is devoted to the analysis of the so-called
concomitant observation (Fig. 3(A)). The subsequent three
subsections are devoted to the so-called independent observation
(Fig. 3(B)).
Concomitant Observation
In this section, we assume that the recipient’s reputation in a
single game is known or not known by the donor and the
observer concomitantly. There are two possible situations in a
single game (see Fig. 3(A)). With probability q, both the donor
and observer know the recipient’s reputation. With probability
1{q, neither the donor nor the observer knows the recipient’s
reputation. WG(s) and WB(s), used in Eqs. (1) and (2), are given
by
WG(s)~q jG,G(s)z(1{q) jU,U(s), ð7Þ
WB(s)~q jB,B(s)z(1{q) jU,U(s), ð8Þ
where j
r,r0(s) is the probability that the action of the donor
obeying s is regarded to be G by the observer, r is the recipient’s
reputation in the donor’s eyes, and r
0
is the recipient’s reputation
in the observer’s eyes. Note that j
r,r0(s)~1{  and   if the
donor’s action is regarded to be G and B except in the case of the
assignment error, respectively.
We found that, except for ALLD, there are 24 pairs of social
norms and action rules in which the action rule is a strict NE. The
number of pairs should actually be considered as 12 because the
system is invariant if we flip G and B in all the entries of the social
norm and the action rule [15]. For example, consider the following
two pairs X and Y of social norm and action rule. X consists of the
social norm under which donors always receive G and the action
rule DISC, i.e., C?G, D?B, and C?U. Y consists of the social
norm under which donors always receive B and the action rule
Figure 3. Different patterns of observation. Different patterns of
observation of the recipient’s reputation. (A) Concomitant observation.
Both the donor and observer know the recipient’s reputation with
probability q, and neither of them knows the recipient’s reputation with
probability 1{q. (B) Independent observation. Both the donor and
observer know the recipient’s reputation with probability q2, only the
donor knows the recipient’s reputation with probability q(1{q), only
the observer knows the recipient’s reputation with probability (1{q)q,
and neither of them knows the recipient’s reputation with probability
(1{q)
2.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002113.g003
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B in X, X and Y are essentially the same. Among the 12 strict NE
pairs, three pairs are cooperative. The unique action rule that is
cooperative under each of the three social norms is DISC.
The three social norms are schematically shown in Fig. 3, where
rows represent the donor’s actions and columns represent the
recipient’s reputations. They are common in that the cooperation
with a G or U recipient is regarded to be G and the defection
against a G or U recipient is regarded to be B. Under these social
norms, observers suspect that donors defecting against U recipients
are defectors. Therefore, we refer to these social norms as
suspicious social norms, namely, suspicious standing, suspicious
judging, and suspicious shunning (Fig. 4(A)). The suspicious social
norms generalize standing, judging, and shunning, which are the
unique stable and cooperative second-order social norms when
everybody knows the reputation of each other (i.e., q~1; Fig. 2)
[23].
Under all the three social norms, DISC is stable in the shaded
parameter region in Fig. 4(B), i.e.,
b
c
w
1
q
: ð9Þ
Equation (9) is also required for indirect reciprocity in a model
with a different assumption for incomplete observation of
reputations [6,7,10]. Generally speaking, the probability q of
knowing the reputation of others must be greater than the cost-to-
benefit ratio c=b for sustaining indirect reciprocity. When
b=cv1=q, DISC is invaded by six action rules, i.e., all the other
action rules except ALLC.
Independent Observation
In this section, we assume that the recipient’s reputation in a
single game is known or not known by the donor and the observer
independently. There are four possible situations in a single game
(see Fig. 3(B)). First, both the donor and observer know the
recipient’s reputation, with probability q2. Second, only the donor
knows the recipient’s reputation, with probability q(1{q). Third,
only the observer knows the recipient’s reputation, with probabil-
ity (1{q)q. Finally, neither of them knows the recipient’s
reputation, with probability (1{q)
2. WG(s) and WB(s), used in
Eqs. (1) and (2), are given by
WG(s)~q2 jG,G(s)zq(1{q) jG,U(s)z
(1{q)q jU,G(s)z(1{q)
2 jU,U(s)
ð10Þ
and
WB(s)~q2 jB,B(s)zq(1{q) jB,U(s)z
(1{q)q jU,B(s)z(1{q)
2 jU,U(s):
ð11Þ
We found that, except for ALLD, there are essentially 27 pairs
of social norms and action rules in which the action rule is a strict
NE. Seven of these 27 pairs are cooperative. As in the case of the
concomitant observation (see subsection ‘‘Concomitant Observa-
tion’’ above), the unique action rule that is cooperative under each
of the seven social norms is DISC. Figure 5(A), 5(C), 5(E), and 5(G)
represents the seven social norms. The corresponding parameter
regions in which DISC is stable under these social norms are
shown in Fig. 5(B), 5(D), 5(F), and 5(H).
The three social norms shown in Fig. 5(A) and 5(C) are those
found in the case of the concomitant observation (Fig. 4(A)), i.e.,
suspicious standing, suspicious judging, and suspicious shunning.
Under suspicious standing and suspicious shunning (Fig. 5(A)),
DISC is stable in the shaded parameter region in Fig. 5(B), i.e.,
1
q
v
b
c
v
1
q(1{q)
: ð12Þ
Under suspicious judging (Fig. 5(C)), DISC is stable in the shaded
parameter region in Fig. 5(D), i.e.,
2
1
q
v
b
c
v
1
q(1{2q)
, if qv
1
2
,
1
q
v
b
c
, if q§
1
2
:
ð13Þ
The condition b=cw1=q is similar to that for the concomitant
observation (Eq. (9)). When b=cv1=q, DISC is invaded by six
action rules, i.e., all the other action rules except ALLC.I n
contrast to the case of the concomitant observation, there are
upper bounds of b=c for DISC to be stable under the three
suspicious social norms. When b=cv1= q(1{q) ½  in Eq. (12) or
b=cv1= q(1{2q) ½  in Eq. (13) is violated, DISC is invaded by
ALLC for the following intuitive reason. Because of the
probability   (w0) with which the assignment error occurs, the
reputation of some DISC players is B. Let us suppose that a
recipient’s actual reputation B is correctly known by the donor but
not by the observer; the recipient’s reputation in the observer’s
eyes is U. This event can occur in the case of the independent, but
not concomitant, observation. In this situation, a DISC donor X1
defects against the recipient and gains a B reputation. Meanwhile,
Figure 4. Social norms (concomitant observation). Social norms that realize indirect reciprocity in the case of concomitant observation. (A)
Suspicious standing, suspicious judging, and suspicious shunning. (B) Under these three social norms, DISC is stable and cooperative in the shaded
parameter region, which is given by Eq. (9). The bold line represents b=c~1=q.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002113.g004
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DISC donors in later rounds help X2 but not X1. Therefore,
ALLC invades DISC.
The three social norms shown in Fig. 5(E) constitute another set
of generalizations of standing, judging, and shunning. They differ
from the suspicious social norms (Figs. 4(A), 5(A), and 5(C)) in that
the defection against a recipient having reputation U in the
observer’s eyes is regarded to be G. Under these social norms,
observers trust donors defecting against U recipients by supposing
that the donors are discriminators defecting against B recipients
and not that the donors are mere defectors. Therefore, we call
them trustful social norms, i.e., trustful standing, trustful judging,
and trustful shunning. Under the three trustful social norms, DISC
is stable when
b
c
w
1
q2 , ð14Þ
which is a stricter condition than b=cw1=q. ALLC does not
invade DISC under these trustful social norms. Intuitively, this is
because defection against a U recipient in the eyes of the observer
is regarded to be G, which cancels the superiority of ALLC over
DISC that is present under the suspicious social norms. However,
q must be larger than that in the case of the suspicious social norms
to prevent invasion by other action rules. This is because observers
do not assign a B reputation and cannot discriminate mere
defectors from discriminators when the recipient’s reputation is U
in the observer’s eyes. When b=cv1=q2, DISC is invaded by six
action rules, i.e., all the other action rules except ALLC.
The social norm shown in Fig. 5(G) is not a variant of standing,
judging, or shunning. Because cooperation with B recipients is
only regarded to be B when the recipient’s reputation is known
under this social norm, we name this social norm suspicious-
Theognis after the ancient Greek poet Theognis of Megara, who
said ‘‘He that doeth good to the baser sort suffereth two ills—
deprivation of goods and no thanks’’ [33]. Suspicious-Theognis is
Figure 5. Social norms (independent observation). Social norms that realize indirect reciprocity in the case of independent observation. (A)
Suspicious standing and suspicious shunning. Under these two social norms, DISC is stable and cooperative in the shaded parameter region in (B),
which is given by Eq. (12). (C) Suspicious judging. Under this social norm, DISC is stable and cooperative in the shaded parameter region in (D),
which is given by Eq. (13). (E) Trustful standing, trustful judging, and trustful shunning. Under these three social norms, DISC is stable and
cooperative in the shaded parameter region in (F), which is given by Eq. (14). (G) Suspicious-Theognis. Under this social norm, DISC is stable and
cooperative in the shaded parameter region in (H), which is given by Eq. (15). The bold lines in (B), (D), (F), and (H) represent b=c~1=q.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002113.g005
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suspicious-Theognis, defection against G recipients in the eyes of
the observer is regarded to be G. This assignment event can occur
only when the recipient actually has a G reputation. In this
situation, the DISC donor never defects; the DISC donor defects
only when the recipient actually has B reputation. Consequently,
the DISC player’s payoff is the same under suspicious judging and
suspicious-Theognis, whereas the parameter region in which
DISC is stable against the other action rules differs for the two
social norms.
Under suspicious-Theognis, DISC is stable in the shaded
parameter region in Fig. 5(H), i.e.,
1
q(1{q)
v
b
c
v
1
q(1{2q)
, if qv
1
2
,
1
q(1{q)
v
b
c
, if q§
1
2
:
ð15Þ
The condition b=cw1= q(1{q) ½  is severer than b=cw1=q, which
corresponds to suspicious judging (Eq. (13)). Regardless of the
value of q, b=cw4 is necessary for cooperation under suspicious-
Theognis (Eq. (15)); however, as q?1, only b=cw1 is needed
under the other six social norms including suspicious judging.
When b=cv1= q(1{q) ½  , DISC is invaded by six action rules, i.e.,
all the other action rules except ALLC.I fb=cw1= q(1{2q) ½  ,
ALLC invades DISC for the same reason as that for the three
suspicious social norms shown in Fig. 5(A) and 5(C). Paradoxically,
the condition under which DISC is stable is severe when q is large.
When observers know recipients’ reputations, they always assign G
to donors defecting against recipients. Therefore, when q is large,
DISC is invaded by other defective action rules. In the limit q?1,
DISC is unstable regardless of the value of b=c. In contrast, the
other six social norms shown in Fig. 5(A), 5(C), and 5(E) converge
to the conventional standing, judging, or shunning norms in the
limit q?1. Our results obtained in this and the previous sections
are consistent with those in the previous literature obtained for
q~1 [23].
Different Probabilities of Knowing the Recipient’s
Reputation by Donor and Observer under Incomplete
Observation
In Model, we assumed that donors and observers know the
reputation of recipients with the same probability q. However, this
probability may also be different for donors and observers because
a player may have different interests or attention levels depending
on whether the player faces a game as donor or observer. In the
case of concomitant observation (see Results), this distinction is
irrelevant. Let q1 and q2 be the probabilities that the donor and
the observer know the recipient’s reputation in a single game,
respectively. In the case of independent observation, the
parameter regions in which DISC is stable are shown in Table 1.
Table 1 indicates that all the four conditions contain the factor
1=q1 in their lower bounds of b=c. This implies that if donors know
recipients’ reputation with a large probability, DISC is relatively
resistant to invasion by six action rules, i.e., all the other action
rules except ALLC.
Three of the four conditions (except for the trustful social norms
shown in Fig. 5(E)) have upper bounds of b=c that also contain the
factor 1=q1. Therefore, if donors know recipients’ reputations
sufficiently frequently, DISC is invaded by ALLC. The reason for
this is the same as that described in subsection ‘‘Independent
Observation’’ above. DISC donors defect against recipients if they
know that the recipients’ reputations are B, whereas such defection
is regarded to be B if the observers do not know the recipients’
reputations. In contrast, ALLC donors do not receive B
reputation via this route. However, because the three upper
bounds of b=c contain the factor 1=(1{q2) or 1=(1{2q2), a large
value of q2 prevents the invasion by ALLC. This is because, if the
observers know the recipients’ reputations sufficiently frequently,
DISC donors’ defection against B recipients is judged as G.A s
explained in ‘‘Independent Observation’’, the situation in which
the donor does and the observer does not know the recipient’s
reputation crucially affects the upper bounds of the parameter
region in which DISC is stable. The lower bound of b=c for
suspicious-Theognis (Fig. 5(G)) contains the factor 1=(1{q2).
Under this social norm, the blindness of the observer enlarges the
stability region of DISC. This occurs intuitively because if
observers know recipients’ reputation with a large probability,
defection tends to be regarded as G.
Comparison of Different Social Norms under Incomplete
Observation
To identify the most efficient of the seven social norms, we
compare them in terms of the payoff that the DISC player obtains.
In the homogeneous population, the payoff of DISC is given by
(b{c) Y(s,p ). Therefore, the question of highest efficiency is
reduced to the comparison of Y(s,p ) derived from the different
social norms. In Eq. (6), Y0(s,p )~1 is satisfied under all the
seven social norms because we have imposed cooperativeness.
Thus, we compare Y1(s,p ) in Eq. (6). Because the payoff of
DISC under the suspicious judging and suspicious-Theognis
norms is exactly the same, we compare the payoffs of DISC under
the six social norms shown in Fig. 5(A), 5(C), and 5(E).
Figure 6 shows the social norms that realize the largest payoff of
DISC for various values of q and b=c. Trustful standing is the most
efficient when
b
c
w
1
q2 ð16Þ
holds (blue region). Suspicious standing is the most efficient when
1
q
v
b
c
vmin
1
q(1{q)
,
1
q2

ð17Þ
Table 1. Stability regions for DISC when donors and
observers may have different amount of information.
Social norms Parameter regions in which DISC is stable
Fig. 5(A) 1=q1vb=cv1=q1:1=(1{q2)
Fig. 5(C) 1=q1vb=cv1=q1:1=(1{2q2)
Fig. 5(E) 1=q1:1=q2vb=c
Fig. 5(G) 1=q1:1=(1{q2)vb=cv1=q1:1=(1{2q2)
q1 and q2 are the probabilities that the donor and the observer know the
recipient’s reputation in a single game, respectively. If the benefit-to-cost ratio
b=c is smaller than the lower bound, DISC is invaded by six action rules, i.e., all
the other action rules except ALLC.I fb=c is larger than the upper bound,
DISC is invaded by ALLC. To prevent the invasion by the six action rules,
DISC donors must have sufficient information about recipients’ reputations
under all the social norms. To prevent the invasion by ALLC, observers must
have sufficient information about recipients’ reputations under suspicious social
norms (Fig. 5(A), Fig. 5(C), and Fig. 5(G)). This is not the case under trustful social
norms (Fig. 5(E)).
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002113.t001
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standing. DISC under the suspicious judging and suspicious-
Theognis has an equal and the highest payoff when
1
q(1{q)
v
b
c
vmin
1
q(1{2q)
,
1
q2

ð18Þ
holds (yellow region). This parameter region (yellow) is narrower
than those in which the variants of standing are the most efficient
(blue and green). Nowhere in the parameter region are variants of
shunning the most efficient. When qw1=2, only the variants of
standing are the most efficient. When qƒ1=2, the variants of
standing and judging are the most efficient for different ranges of
b=c and q. Variants of standing are the most efficient in a broad
parameter region; this is intuitively because observers under
variants of standing assign G to donors more often than observers
under variants of judging and shunning and because the fraction
of cooperation increases with the number of G players. However,
to prevent the invasion by defectors, observers should assign B to
inappropriate donors.
Discussion
The present study is motivated by the premise that in a
relatively large-scale society, players and observers may not know
each other even indirectly. Under any viable social norm, the
unique action rule DISC stabilizes a cooperative society. DISC
cooperates with good and unknown recipients and defects against
bad recipients. DISC behaves trustfully toward (i.e., cooperates
with) unknown recipients, and such a trustful discriminator also
supports cooperation in other models of indirect reciprocity
[6,7,18,19,31,32]. We emphasize that we did not prefabricate
DISC but derived it through an exhaustive search.
Previous studies only focused on social norms of discrete orders.
Under first-order social norms (q~0 for observers), observers have
no information about the reputation of players. Under higher-
order social norms (q~1 for observers), observers have the
complete information about the reputation of players. We set
0vqƒ1 for observers as well as for donors. The social norms that
we discovered can be classified into suspicious social norms in
which observers discriminate between cooperative and defective
donors interacting with unknown recipients and trustful social
norms in which observers always assign a good reputation to
donors interacting with unknown recipients. In the case of
independent observation, there is a trade-off between trustful
and suspicious social norms. Trustful social norms are more
efficient in the sense that they yield the highest payoff of DISC
when they are stable (blue region in Fig. 6), while suspicious social
norms enable indirect reciprocity down to a smaller value of q.W e
have only considered the case in which all the players in a
population obey a unique social norm. Note that a few recent
studies investigated competition between players obeying different
norms [34–36]. In contrast, such a trade-off does not exist for
donors; trustful donors are always better than suspicious donors in
our model and in the previous models [2,7,18].
The exhaustive search method was pioneered by Ohtsuki &
Iwasa [15]. In Ref. [15], the combinations of third-order social
norm and action rule under complete observation are exhaustively
searched. By definition, the third-order social norms and action
rules depend not only on the donor’s action and the recipient’s
reputation but also on the donor’s reputation. Ohtsuki & Iwasa
[15] found that the eight third-order social norms, called the
leading eight, sustain indirect reciprocity. The discriminator or the
so-called contrite TFT is stable and cooperative depending on the
social norm included in the leading eight. The leading eight
possesses properties similar to those of the stable and cooperative
second-order social norms that we discovered. The leading eight
includes essentially second-order simple-standing and stern-
judging, whose extensions were identified as stable and cooper-
ative social norms in the present study. In contrast, shunning,
which we discovered in the extended form, is not included in the
leading eight. This discrepancy is caused by the different
assumptions regarding incomplete observation employed in these
studies; Ohtsuki & Iwasa set q~1, and we set 0vqƒ1.I fq~1,
observers obeying shunning always assign B to donors when
recipients have B reputation. Therefore, the reputation dynamics
leads to a large fraction of B players. If 0vqv1, observers may
assign G to donors when the observers do not know the recipients’
reputations. In fact, the results for shunning are qualitatively
different between the cases q~1 and 0vqv1. We did not explore
third-order social norms (i.e., social norms using donors’
reputations) with incomplete observation (0vqv1) because it
would be difficult to comprehend plethora of results obtained from
the exhaustive search of third-order social norms with 0vqv1.
Instead, we found that the trustful and suspicious second-order
social norms, which are distinguished for 0vqv1, sustain indirect
reciprocity.
In the donation game under a second-order social norm, we
should distinguish between three types of the observation
probability q, as shown in Fig. 7. q1 is the probability that the
donor knows the recipient’s reputation. q2 is the probability that
the observer knows the recipient’s reputation and uses it to assign a
reputation to the donor. q3 is the probability that the observer
observes the donor’s action and assigns a reputation to the donor.
Observers are confined to a first-order social norm when q2~0
and can use complete second-order social norms when q2~1.
If q1~q2~q3~1, the discriminator is stable under three
second-order social norms, i.e., simple standing, stern judging, and
shunning [23]. Nowak & Sigmund [6,7] studied the case 0vq1ƒ1
under image scoring (i.e., q2~0). When q3~1, cooperation is
difficult for a small value of q1 and a necessary condition for
indirect reciprocity is given by b=cw1=q1 [7]. Although our model
is different from theirs, our results are consistent with this
necessary condition for their model. They also performed
Figure 6. Most efficient social norms. Social norms under which
DISC is the most efficient. In the blue region, trustful standing is the
most efficient. In the green region, suspicious standing is the most
efficient. In the yellow region, suspicious judging and suspicious-
Theognis are equally the most efficient. Outside these regions, only
ALLD is stable. The bold line represents b=c~1=q.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002113.g006
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probability q3 (v1) and updates the image score of the donor X2
[6]. X1 refers to the image score of X2 only when X1 plays with X2
as donor. Panchanathan & Boyd [18] considered two different
action rules, discriminator and contrite TFT, under a third-order
standing norm. They found that both strategies can be ESS for
q3~1. Brandt & Sigmund [21] numerically analyzed the case
q1~q2~1 and 0vq3ƒ1. They showed that for a small q3,
cooperation is relatively easily accomplished under image scoring
and third-order standing than third-order judging. Following
Mohtashemi & Mui [30], Brandt & Sigmund [31] investigated the
image scoring (i.e., q2~0) when q3~1 and q1 (ƒ1) increases with
time. They found that the trustful discriminator and the
unconditional cooperator can stably coexist. Finally, Brandt &
Sigmund [19] elaborated the case 0vq1ƒ1, q3~1 under image
scoring (q2~0) in various situations. Table 2 summarizes the
previous models. In the present study, we conducted an exhaustive
search of stable and cooperative pairs of social norms and action
rules when 0vq1ƒ1, 0vq2ƒ1, and q3~1.
In the context of incomplete observation, most previous models
of indirect reciprocity assumed that the ability of observers is either
null (q2~0) or complete (q2~1) (see Table 2), which is in contrast
with the graduated ability of observation (i.e., 0vq1ƒ1) assumed
for donors. If a player acts as a donor and an observer in different
situations, it seems likely to assume real-valued q2 (0vq2ƒ1). For
this case, we showed that indirect reciprocity is possible for various
values of q1 and q2.
Under incomplete observation, a small fraction of players may
observe a donor X1’s action, and these observers may inform
others of X1’s reputation via gossip [10,15]. Suppose that a player
observes a one-shot game and propagates X1’s reputation to the
entire population with probability q and that nobody observes the
one-shot game with probability 1{q. In this case, when X1 is
selected as a recipient in a later one-shot game, the donor and the
observer of this game may concomitantly know X1’s reputation.
Alternatively, suppose that the initial observers always exist and
propagate X1’s reputation to a fraction, q, of players directly or
indirectly. If X1 is later selected as recipient and the observer is
always selected from the neighborhood of the donor in the social
network of gossiping, it is probable that the donor and observer
concomitantly know the recipient’s reputation. Independent
observation does not require these assumptions and may be more
natural than concomitant observation. We showed that in our
model, even with independent observation, cooperation is
achieved in a large parameter region, albeit smaller than that
for the concomitant observation.
Previous studies focused on the situation that donors, but not
observers, have incomplete information about the society. Without
an authority responsible for reputation assignment, we believe that
donors and observers are temporary and not fixed roles for
individuals such that observers as well as donors are exposed to
incomplete information. The present results provide an important
step toward understanding indirect reciprocity in self-sustaining
societies.
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